the Egyptian political system and secondly on the security forces as powerful agents of government.
Next, the essay will focus on the Egyptian Ultras and their identification processes; what it means to be an Ultra, how they identify themselves and why they mobilise. Finally, the paper will analyse the implications of the Ultras in the uprisings, as a result of a combination of factors, including the Ultra code, their experience in street fights, the feeling of injustice and the will to "fight for what is right".
A study of the Egyptian case, and more specifically of a bottom-up case focusing on traditionally non-political groups such as the Ultras, is useful as it provides new insights for the study of contentious politics in the Middle East. These everyday dynamics are reshaping societies in the Middle East in ways that are not usually acknowledged by Western onlookers and unwelcomed by authoritarian powerholders in the region i . Recognising the power of local actors such as the Ultras and examining the dayto-day activities of these "non-political movements" sheds light on the new ways by which ordinary individuals diminish the state's overwhelming power, resulting in profound changes within their
The idea here is not to elaborate nor develop existing theories, but rather to analyse and question these supporters' action through the use of existing theories and concepts related to theories of collective action, collective identity and mobilisation. Although collective action is a core characteristic of social movements, it is too soon, in our view, to dub these supporters "social movement" because of their will to refrain from the political debate as well as the lack of hindsight allowing for a proper analysis. The subject may be too current to conduct a rigorous analysis without risking a misguided and misinformed examination.
It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the growing literature on contentious politics by focusing on a topic that has rarely been studied in this regard, namely the implication of football supporters. How and in what way(s) did football supporters play a significant role in the events unfolding in Egypt? The goal is to examine the ways by which a non-political group of football supporters was brought to engage in a highly political contentious struggle with the Egyptian authorities, alongside activists, protesters and established social movements. Through the use of concepts relating to identity and a perceived sense of injustice, the essay will shed light on the growing phenomenon that is the "Oltras" For the purpose of the case at hand, the choice of interviews is motivated by the desire to understand the supporters' motives for participation in the uprisings as well as to grasp the elements of their identification process that help shed light on these same motives. Although interviews include a smaller sample of respondents than surveys, they gather a much wider and deeper range of responses which can lead to follow-up questions, penetrating more acutely in the actions and attitudes of the participants. Follow-ups can be of particular interest when the respondent appears to hold a contradictory rhetoric, and came in handy when interviewing the Ultras especially with regard to the contradiction between their will to refrain from political participation and their highly political actions.
The sample does not aim at being representative of Egyptian supporters. It includes six young men between the ages of 19 and 27 and one young 24 years old woman; four are Ahly supporters and three are Zamalek supporters. Among the respondents, five are university students and two are working: one in the textile industry, the other, as a freelance photographer and artist. The female respondent is a leading figure in the Women's Ultras White Knights (Zamalek), while the male respondents cover a wider range within the group. Two of them are prominent figures within the Ultras Ahlawy (Ahly), and Ultras White Knights (Zamalek) respectively. The remaining 4 are active members of the group but do not hold key positions within it. The difficulty in such groups is the heterogeneity and multifaceted diversity. In addition to being supporters, some are involved in political or religious movements. To overcome the diverging opinions and religious confessions, the different supporter groups collectively agreed to avoid discussing sensitive issues such as religion or politics and focus on its original purpose, which is football. The gathered data helped to establish connections between members of the group as well as between the members of opposing groups. The interviews finally and more importantly reveal a strong presence of collective identity within the supporter groups and a strong sense of belonging and identification to the country and its struggle.
Contentious politics in authoritarian regimes
When approaching the study of contentious collective action in the Middle East, the first question to raise, is when are these mobilisations most likely to emerge, especially in authoritarian contexts.
While many scholars give a central role to grievance vi , it is not sufficient to be turned into a sustained protest and have to include the availability of resources (material and symbolic), regime opponents, changes in the international context, and changes in the political opportunity structure to name but a few vii . Indeed, according to Paszynska, the emergence and presence of fissures among the ruling elite is often accompanied by the appearance of elite allies willing to establish an "alliance" with the social groups. The State becomes less willing or less able to deploy repression, meaning that challenging authority is less costly and more likely to succeed. Contentious collective action is more frequent when the "perceived probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving the desired outcome" viii .
Egypt's democratic façade and the development of contentious collective action
When contentious collective action develops in authoritarian contexts, another question is the probability of the dictatorship leading to a process of democratisation rather than its replacement by another authoritarian rule. The political system in Egypt, since the abdication of King Farouk in 1952, has been a succession of semi-authoritarian rules. When news broke that Mubarak had stepped down from power on 11 February 2011, it came as a surprise, not only to the world, but also and more importantly to specialists in the study of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Albrecht's book . In their opinion, contentious collective action is an "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants."
Contentious Politics in the Middle
As mentioned earlier, the development of contentious action in Egypt is complicated by the regime's response to counter-powers: strong "coercive agencies" who have "carte blanche" when it comes to 'defending state interests'. These police forces usually resolve to "routine" forms of repression, such as surveillance, threats, harassment, detention and "legal persecution", to restrict and discourage any kind of dissident behaviour. The Egyptian case is interesting in this regard; firstly because it sheds light on the weaknesses of such authoritarian regimes and secondly because it allows for a first-hand analysis of the development of large-scale mobilisation.
The police: a powerful agent of government
In the next section, we will focus on the government's instrumentalisation of police forces as a means to resist any opposing force, regardless of its political orientation. It is important to underline that national security in Egypt is divided between the police and the army. This intrusiveness can be attributable to several political factors that have aided the police in consolidating their power, notably the role it was assigned in repressing the Islamist opposition, dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. Another important factor was the state's decision to withdraw from certain welfare provisions and its promotion of neo-liberal economic policies, which led to the development of an informal labour market as well as the privatisation of social services xxix . Both these factors resulted not only in the heightening of security controls, but also and more importantly, it reinforced the existing corrupt system. In addition to serving the interests of the ruling elite, security forces developed their own corrupt culture, instating a system of bribes and placing what is known as "plain-clothes" policemen -civilians hired by police and security forces to collect information -in neighbourhoods under the pretence of ensuring stability and peace. To do so without raising suspicion xxx , the police usually position their undercover informants in local communities by providing them with a vending kiosk or by appointing them to the carta system, shuttle buses and vans. As an Egyptian aptly put it, "we don't feel safe because we always feel like we are being watched. … The other day, I was coming home and I was approached by a policeman. I got fined because I did not have A key characteristic of the 25 th of January Revolution was the fact that the extent of the protest caught the police off guard, as they were not expecting such an outcome. On 28 January (Friday of Anger), police forces were overwhelmed and forced to retreat. Because of the increase of desertion within their ranks, as well as the army's refusal to use fire against "the people of Egypt" . Football supporters, and Ultras in particular, resort to violence in cases of "self-defence", notably when they are being hassled by the police at the end of football matches due to their use of flares and "politically incorrect" slogans xli . Police forces routinely arrest supporters the night before the game for "questioning", to ensure that they do not represent a threat to "national security" and release them the day after, sometimes in a bad shape xlii . Their use of violence is not only limited to self-defence. Some of the more "hard-core" fans customarily organise "street fights" with rival supporter clubs bringing their activities closer to those of traditional hooligans xliii .
The Ultras' clashes with the police are cultivated in a long history of violent encounters, of humiliations (the police often use the expression "ya walad" meaning "you boy", closely related to the reference to "boy" used during the segregationist period in the United States) and harassment xliv .
One of the respondents explained his encounter with the police in these terms: "I was arrested by the police because he recognised me. The day before we went to Tahrir with the oltras and he saw us. He feared us when we walked by him. But felt so powerful when I was alone with him and his "friends".
The difference is we didn't attack him. It's a question of principle". He was released the day after, and had been beaten up when he refused to give up information regarding his "suspicious activities" (he implied that they wanted information regarding his activities as an Ultra but they never said it openly): "It's easier to attack someone when they are alone and cannot defend himself. They are cowards".
The feeling of anger and humiliation is an important feature of the relationship between the Ultras and the police, as it contributes to the development of a sense of injustice, which in turn encourages an upsurge of violence against police forces and shapes the supporters' identity ("I am an Ultra, and as an Ultra, I am opposed to any kind of figure of authority").
Egyptian Ultras: identity, idealism and politics
One key component of the Ultras' identity is this intrinsic opposition to police and security forces. It is therefore very difficult to establish the Ultras' intentions in the early days of the uprisings and it seems improbable that there was any collective intention in participating as a distinguished group, the Ultras. They basically brought their years of experience in fighting against the police -and rival supporter groups -from the stadium to the streets, thus playing an indispensable role in major key battles, including the Battle of the Camel and the infamous Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud.
The clashes of Port Said, on the other hand, were, from the Ultras' point of view, a direct attempt, from the Ministry of Interior, on the Ultras as a social group and resulted in nationwide mobilisations.
The whole incident raises too many questions to be dismissed as a violent act of hooliganism. Seen as an act orchestrated by the Ministry of Interior, and moving up the hierarchy as high as the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling force at the time of the events, the Ultras massively mobilised to voice their discontent, shifting their energy and activities from the stadium to civil society.
Their politicisation process was epitomised by the truce called between both Ahly and Zamalek clubs. In effect, after the death of the 74 Ahly fans, both supporter groups decided to suspend their rival activities and unite in support of the victims. This decision can be explained by the fact that the "Ultras", as a social group, felt under attack and were singled out -in their view -by the Ministry of
Interior as a threat, causing the deaths of Port Said. Symbols of this union adorn the walls of Cairo, Alexandria and Egypt as a whole. It also galvanised a wave of solidarity among supporters in other major cities such as Istanbul and Rome, revealing the extent of solidarity between these supporter group as well as a strong "supporters' identity" which cuts through linguistic, cultural and territorial boundaries. Indeed, the Port Said incident threatened their identity as a social group, independent from their other activities, and explains their mobilisation.
The "Ultra identity": football, loyalty and collective action
"What does it mean to be an Ultra"?
"Being an Ultra is more than football. Being an Ultra means you respect the code and live by it.
… Being an Ultra is about loving football, your team and your people. You know…we look out for each other" lv .
The Ultras' identity is deeply rooted in football and is revealed most frequently during the games, What is ignored about these football supporters is their high level of organisation and structure within the group. The leadership structure is centralised, subdivided into regional structures, and local meetings are organised when important decisions need to be made. However, in practice, the organisation is both centralised and decentralised. The predominance of a horizontal structure helps reinforce group attitudes and moderates divisive issues between members with diverging ideological opinions or convictions lix .
Castells defines identity as referring to social actors; as being a process of "construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, that is given priority over other sources of meaning" lx . For any given individual or collective actor, there may be a plurality of identities. Identity however, must be distinguished from what sociologists call "roles" or "role-sets".
According to Castells, roles (being a student, a mother, a politician, a football player) are defined by society and its definition of norms. This paper will apply the definition of identity as "a source of meaning for the actors themselves, constructed through a process of individuation lxi , as well as a way of distinguishing themselves for other people/groups".
Identity is a key concept when analysing the dynamics of social protest in Egypt. According to
Klandermans & Simon, "people evince political collective identity to the extent that they engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out" As discussed above, the identity of football supporters is consolidated around team commitment, but also and more importantly around pride and discipline. Beshir explains: "Your eyes cannot miss an Ultra, whether inside or outside the stadium. By nature, he is proud, aware of his importance among the rest of his people who respect him for his capabilities." lxviii More importantly, it seems that their identity as football supporters, as Ultras, goes beyond the stadium and guides their daily lives, as is shown by the presence of an Ultra Code. This code includes notably the obligation not to get involved politically, (remain neutral with regard to political ideas -this is to be understood as political in the sense of "party politics"); to treat everyone equally, regardless of gender, class, religion, conviction;
not to attack the weak; and to always stand for what is right lxix . Though they claim to be "just a group of supporters" who express their love and loyalty to their club as well as to set themselves apart from regular fans, the presence of such a code implies that their identity may exceed the sole purpose of supporting and conceal another, deeper dimension.
The most striking element in this set of rules is the obligation to remain "politically neutral", which contradicts what has been observed during the uprisings. How to explain the inconsistency between their actions and their discourse? Jean Leca underlined that the definition of the "political object" depends on two factors, namely the value given to an action by the subject and its evaluation by the power-holders lxx . The limits of the "political object" are thus to be found in the balance of powers between the different groups at play as well as by the group/subject itself. In other words, the Ultras' actions can be interpreted as political, essentially because they are given a political overtone by power-holders and analysts, even though the group itself has not grounded its actions politically.
Football supporters in Egypt (and around the world) do not wish to be seen as political or politicised, because being "political" to them, relates to "party politics" and being "politicised" implies that they are being used by political forces: "We steer clear of politics. Competition in Egypt is on the pitch. We break the rules and regulations when we think they are wrong. You don't change things in Egypt talking about politics. We're not political, the government knows that and that is why it has to deal with us" lxxi . Their refrain from the political sphere is also justified by the fact that it would question their autonomy as well as clash with the group's core beliefs. They set themselves apart from any other group of supporters and identify themselves only with the club. Being subject to "political manipulation" or allowing politics to enter the group would undermine its credibility and even its existence. One respondent explains: "In the Ultras you have leftists, and liberals, and salafis, and Ikhuan (Muslim Brotherhood). There are even Jews and Copts so we don't talk about those things.
Politics is not important. We love our club so we don't lose time fighting for no reason. We let politicians do that" lxxii .
Bottom-up mobilisations in Egypt: the Ultras' participation in the Revolution
The Ultras identify by way of their love for their club and direct their mobilisations towards visibility and support. In the context of the Egyptian Revolution however, their actions took a highly political turn, not because they chose to fight for political ideals, but because their actions were interpreted by onlookers -national and international -as being highly political. We have chosen to stick to a broad conceptualisation of political participation with reference to activities of "political nature or having political implications that aim at affecting policy change whether formally or informally by actors within civil society organisations, social movements, and/or citizens" lxxiii .
What role, what motives?
The established social movements such as Kefaya and the 6 th of April Movement called upon the Ultras to ensure the security of protesters during the first demonstrations on 25 January 2011. These movements turned to the Ultras because they are notorious for their clashes with police and security forces. Cultivated in a history of violence due to their football-related activities, the Ultras were seen, by the population, as one of the only groups, not only capable of resisting the riot police, but also competent enough to teach them the necessary guerrilla techniques to fight back if push came to shove.
Ultras became a surprisingly central actor in the large-scale popular uprisings, bringing their organisational unity, their turbulent spirit and their fighting experience to Tahrir Square. As their actions against riot police became increasingly visible, and their participation and numbers grew, their reputation shifted. They went from "stadium hooligans" to "national heroes" The Oltras are coming!" lxxvi are fairly representative of the newly found respect the Ultras inspire among the public. Nawara Negm, a well-known opposition activist and journalist tweeted: "During the revolution sit-in in Mohamed Mahmoud, Ultras youth used to donate their blankets to the women sleeping in the street in the cold winter days. They usually gave the excuse that they are not continuing and will go home. I followed one of them from a distance to see if he was really going home. But no. He walked away a short distance and then crouched in the entrance of a building to sleep. Without cover" lxxvii .
The football supporters' will to maintain a "neutral political colour" should be regarded as an asset rather than a weakness, according to Melucci's theory of collective action lxxviii . Rather than rallying with a given political or religious force, the Ultras used their dynamism, group mentality, and turbulent attitude to rally protesters and give them the necessary motivation and positivity to pursue the political struggle lxxix .
Defrance further noted that apoliticism could be described as "a way of doing politics, by seeking to unite unanimous masses and shared goals beyond partisan divisions" They view themselves as entirely independent from the world of party politics, which they condemn By doing "what was right" in their opinion, these supporters implicated themselves in a political struggle alongside political activists and normal citizens, even though they did not necessarily adhere to the ideals they were defending. They got involved, firstly because violence is a central part of their activities, but mainly because the use of violence, limited to self-defence, is justified by their moral obligation -as members of the Ultras and believers of the "Code" -to act on behalf of "morality" and "righteousness" lxxxv . The Ultras resort to violence in two cases. The first is related to their supporting activities and is tightly connected to their opposition with the riot police. They justify these violent encounters by underlining the fact that they are fighting on a levelled playing field; against an equal opponent. This element is strongly related to the second case in which they resort to violence, which is the case in which a person in being attacked by a stronger opponent. This last element is unequivocally correlated with their participation in the uprisings. The respondents' justification was to say "they were doing what was right", however one the leading figures of Ultras Ahlawy explained
that "doing what is right" is rooted in a complete aversion for injustice.
The second factor which provides an explanation for the supporters' motives for mobilisation, which is intrinsically linked to the first, is their fundamental opposition to police brutality. Football supporters and the police share a long history of violence and confrontation, dating back to their early actions as supporters. During the uprisings, the Ultras used their experience to resist police brutality.
Their presence was unmistakeably visible in some of the major battles, including the battle of Mohamed Mahmoud Street. Their involvement there was crucial because it marked the first big victory against the oppressive system. More importantly that victory exposed the cracks of a declining regime, which, in turn, encouraged current and future demonstrators to take to the streets lxxxvi .
The final element refers to the perception of injustice developed within the group as a result of years of harassment, intimidation and humiliations. The Egyptian Revolution was used as a pretext to unleash the anger and satisfy a desire for retribution fed by years of conflict and violent encounters with government officials. This factor took a particular meaning in the aftermath of the events of Port Said, when thousands of supporters around the country took to the streets and demanded the prosecution and incarceration of those responsible for the incidents. Ahly Ultras as well as Zamalek
Ultras converged to different points of interest around Egypt (Tahrir, Port Said, Alexandria, the stadium) for weeks before the verdict, even threatening the regime: "justice or chaos" lxxxvii .
The truce called between both rival clubs (and between all rival supporter groups around the country) can be explained by the desire to fight injustice. These groups share the same basic ideals.
The only detail setting them apart from one another is the fact that they support rival clubs. So when the group of supporters (as a whole, no distinction between clubs or affiliations) comes under attack, it would be normal to see them express their support and rally against a common enemy or for a common cause. The events of Port Said not only affected the supporters but also the country as a whole. As mentioned previously, identity is central to the individual because it places him within broader society. More than just football supporters, these youngsters were also sons, brothers, cousins, friends, and students in a bigger social milieu. It is worth mentioning that the will of rival camps to make peace with one another and look in the same direction is symptomatic of the level of identification with the nation. As one respondent put it: "We are the Ultras, we are Egypt". 
Conclusion
The Egyptian Revolution impacted on the dynamics of political participation. Formal political participation in Egypt was predominantly restricted to regime-affiliated party activity, co-opted civil society participation, and/or voting in non-transparent and fraudulent elections lxxxviii . This compelled the development of "underground movements" and alternative spaces of freedom. The stadium and the football arena as a whole became one of those spaces, allowed the free expression of opinions and catalysed social tensions and frustrations, ultimately become a space of political socialisation, a space where individuals familiarised themselves with politics and social issues lxxxix . These spaces defied the coercive measures put in place by the government -such as the Law on political parties -to avoid any political opposition and limit the influence of social movements and opposition forces xc .
The aim of this paper was to use the concept of collective identity to explain the supporters' motives for mobilisation. Through the analysis of their powerful sense of belonging and strong ties to the group and the nation, it was possible to identify several aspects that can be useful in deepening our knowledge of the issues and factors interfering in the mobilisation processes and involvement of football supporters, including their strong identification to the group, their intrinsic opposition to police forces as well as their use of tools such as slogans, chants and graffiti.
Their participation started off passive and was specifically focused on security and defence against police brutality. There was no desire to get involved politically and their message was clear going into the Revolution: "Ultras Ahlaway declares that it is a sports group only, which has no political inclinations or affiliations of whatever kind […] ."
xci Other Ultras groups such as Ultras White Knights also circulated similar messages. Their involvement later developed into a more politicised one after the clashes of Port Said, precisely because it was interpreted as a personal attack on the and it threatened the identity of Ultras groups, as a social category, in and out of the country.
When it comes to the Ultras' participation in the large-scale popular uprisings, one must distinguish between their participation as a group and their participation as individuals. The group's involvement in the mobilisation is intrinsically linked and highly dependent on the individual Ultras' choice to take part in the action. This dichotomy further explains the discrepancy in the Ultras' discourse as opposed to their actions. Though the Ultras, as a social group, refuse to associate themselves with any form of ideology and refrain from participating in the political debate, the Ultras, as individuals have been socialised to political issues within and outside of the stadium, which explains their will to mobilise and participate in the revolutionary movement, even supposing its limited scope in the early days.
The study of the Ultras' participation sheds light on the way traditionally non-political groups such as sports groups or musicians and artists come to participate in a revolutionary process and contribute to the movement, even though their primary purpose is not to influence the public debate. More than just being about social movements and their mobilisation, the popular uprisings in Egypt have brought focus to a wide range of actors. The Ultras' participation further suggests the permeability of boundaries between the different portions of society. As Sidney Tarrow pointed out, contentious politics "emerges in response to changes in the political opportunities and threats when participants perceive and respond to a variety of incentives: material and ideological, partisan and group-based, long-standing and episodic." xcii Recognising the power of local actors such as the Ultras and examining the day-to-day activities of these "non-political movements" sheds light on the new ways by which ordinary individuals diminish the state's overwhelming power, resulting in profound changes within their respective communities, as well as within society as a whole.
Future research in the field of sport and the Ultras should include studies on the issue of gender.
Though the purpose of the present essay was not to address these issues, they are a key element when it comes to the study of contentious politics in Egypt and in the Middle East as a whole. One cannot deny the fundamental part the women played in the uprisings. With regard to the Ultras, the question of gender is interesting in three regards. First, because football and football fandom are mostly male dominated. Second, because Egypt is a very conservative society, that the interactions between both sexes are still taboo and that the set of social expectations imposed on women are very different to those imposed to men. Finally, the question of women Ultras groups is very rarely addressed in the literature, and their presence is not always acknowledged. These women groups do not only dismiss the sexist bias that dominates the world of football, but also question the whole conservative nature of the society in which they are evolving. ii Ibid., 
